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Introduction   
ADHD represents the fastest growing diagnosis over the last decade, reflecting a general trend 
of increasing levels of mental health diagnoses. It is today one of the most common 
psychiatric childhood disorders (Stokkeland, 2014), with an estimated 20% of American 
children aged 9-17 being diagnosed with the condition (Brante, 2013). ADHD has traditionally 
been viewed to be a child-diagnosis, and it is only more recently that the diagnosis has begun 
to be applied to adults. This, Kärfve (2013) argues, reflects a general trend within 
neuropsychiatry of ‘child’ conditions increasingly being transferred to adult populations, 
including more extensive use of retrospective diagnoses. Though few studies have established 
any certain findings, the general adult population prevalence of diagnosis is estimated to be 
around 4.5% (Faraone et al, 2000). Comparing these figures to criminal justice specific studies, 
it soon becomes clear that ADHD is significantly overrepresented within the justice system. 
This overrepresentation must, in turn, be situated in the wider context of a higher prevalence 
of mental health disorders experienced by individuals involved with the criminal justice 
system generally (Light et a, 2013), though this is particularly marked for female offenders 
(Corston, 2007).  
In Sweden, recent figures indicate that between 15-45% of the overall prison population fulfils 
the criteria for ADHD (Kriminalvården, 2013). For women specifically – though under-
researched in comparison – the equivalent figure is suggested to stand at around 29% 
(Kriminalvården, 2010). While criminological research on ADHD is overall limited, the gaps 
about ADHD and women involved with criminal justice are particularly large, and more 
research is urgently called for (Konstenius et al, 2012). This paper aims to start to address this 
gap, offering first-hand perspectives on ADHD diagnoses by a small sample of women in the 
Swedish criminal justice system. Recognising that wider contexts, both in terms of criminal 
justice specifically and society more generally, play a role in diagnostic experiences and 
processes (Berger, 2015), the broader socio-economic settings of diagnosis are also given 
attention.  
Following a brief overview of the ADHD literature, with a particular focus on offending, 
treatment and responses, suggested functions and beneficiaries of diagnosis are considered. 
Produced via a feminist methodology, first-hand narratives on diagnosis by a sample of 
currently desisting Swedish women are then presented, critically exploring subjective 
diagnostic functions and purposes. The paper is brought to a close with a conclusionary 
section. Beyond highlighting the role of ADHD narratives in the women’s accounts, wider 
questions regarding the over-reliance on medicalised treatments and discourses in current 
criminal justice context are raised, along with calls for more interdisciplinary and critical 
research in the field. 
 
ADHD and criminal justice 
Exploring ADHD and offending populations in an international context, a study by Young et al 
(2011), looking at findings from the USA, Canada, Sweden, Germany, Finland and Norway, 
found that, overall, half of the adult prison population, and two-thirds of young offenders, 
screen positive for ADHD. Data thus seem to suggest a link between ADHD and offending 
populations, however, the nature of this link remains uncertain. In fact, the aetiology of ADHD 
remains unknown (Savolainen et al, 2010), and although literature suggests that ADHD in 
childhood is a risk factor for involvement in offending in later life, it is important to note that 
no direct association has been proven (Modre et al, 2011). One major issue within research 
around ADHD is that of co-morbidities, including overlaps with a range of disorders such as 
autism, dyslexia, personality disorders, anxiety, depression, and drug and alcohol abuse 
disorder being common (Young et al, 2011). Drug misuse is a factor that is especially relevant 
for criminal justice populations. For example, a study with Swedish women in prison identified 
that all of the women who fulfilled the criteria for ADHD also reported drug problems 
(Kriminalvården, 2010). This is not a unique finding. Stokkeland et al (2014) found that 93% 
of their (all-male) ADHD sample in a Norwegian prison reported lifetime drug dependency. 
With ongoing debates over both the ontological status and the validity of ADHD as an adult 
psychiatric disorder (Schubert et al, 2009), some argue that ADHD is, rather than a condition 
in its own right, a product of other primary conditions; substance abuse being a key one of 
these (Saul, 2016). The relationships between ADHD and drug abuse is a complex one. Self-
medicalised approaches are a part of this complexity, with amphetamine in particular having 
been found to be a drug that is connected to self-medication of ADHD, although this is more 
commonly reported for males than females (Pedersen, Sandberg and Copes, 2015).  
Furthermore, there are a range of other factors that may also play a role in the labelling of 
ADHD. For example, ADHD is linked to both restlessness and lower educational achievement. 
However, there are, of course, many other factors, including social and environmental factors, 
which may impact on these. For example, Savolainen et al (2010) suggest that a lower 
socioeconomic standing is closely linked to the diagnosis. This is a finding that has been 
supported in international studies, with factors such as being a recipient of welfare payments, 
low maternal education and lone parenthood, doubling the likelihood of ADHD diagnosis 
(Hjern, Weitoft and Linblad, 2010, cited in Hill and Turner, 2016). Factors of social adversity 
thus raises further challenging questions about the ability to separate factors. Brante (2013: 
90) argues that the recent heightened focus on neuropsychiatric conditions involves the 
danger "that social and cultural aspects of human behaviour is neglected in favour of 
biological conceptualisations”. We are reminded, though, that the pathologisation of criminal 
behaviour is far from a recent invention, with the links between criminal law and psychiatry 
having dominated especially the European criminological societies since the end of the 19th 
Century (Schneider, 2001). Psychiatric explanations and solutions have gone through various 
waves throughout this period. However, recent years have seen a re-emergence of psychiatric 
language in criminal justice contexts, which has been linked to new ways to define and 
manage certain traits and deviant behaviour (Berger, 2015). For female offending specifically, 
we know that biological explanations have a particularly long and persistent history in 
criminology (Stanko, 1994). 
 
Cultural, social and institutional factors 
New diagnoses can be understood to reflect, and re-produce, contemporary cultural themes. 
Due to their contextual relativity, Hallerstedt (2013) reminds us of the importance of 
interpreting diagnoses through social, political and cultural frameworks. In terms of Sweden 
specifically, Andersson (2012) situates the ADHD trends in the particular context of a Swedish 
tradition of a ‘culture of intervention’, and a persistent priority of medical knowledge above 
individual considerations. In criminological terms, this falls in line with the Swedish, and 
overall Nordic, history of positive criminology (Nilsson, 2013). Indeed, Sweden has a long 
history of engineering individual well-being (Pratt and Ericsson, 2013), which has influenced 
prison reform policy, as a part of a wider welfare state policy agenda. ADHD prevalence 
studies on prisoners have, in fact, their roots in Sweden, dating back to the early 1990s 
(Andersson, 2012). Some argue that recent years have seen a particular re-pathologization of 
offenders in the Swedish criminal justice system, propelled by a new paradigm that aligns 
with the neoliberal agenda (Nilsson, 2013). Privilege is accordingly giving to certain forms of 
knowledge and practices, guided by cognitive-behavioural models. In turn, these models 
emphasise individual responsibility, self-control, and measurable results, creating 
contemporary therapeutic cultures that ‘valorises help-seeking’ (Berger, 2015: 124). Nilsson 
(2013: 35) points out how these discourses very much echo the ‘hyper-positivism’ that is 
prominent in some branches of the natural and medical sciences, relying on under-theorised 
views of the social world.  
In this setting, ADHD experts are given an increasingly prominent voice. Kärfve (2013) draws 
a parallel between Swedish history of eugenics and the contemporary diagnostic system, both 
emphasising physical hereditary, human behaviours and a complete trust in ‘the experts’. 
While high levels of legitimacy in expert opinion is, in terms of penal policy, commonly seen 
as a positive (Green, 2007), the dominance of medical knowledge in this sphere raises new 
questions. Specifically, this is linked to a certain hierarchy of knowledge. For example, in a 
study by Hill and Turner (2016), power imbalances between professionals in the education 
field and in the medical field strongly showed that individuals working in education 
persistently experienced their views and experiences around ADHD as being relegated as 
unimportant in comparison to health professionals’ views and experiences.  
Drawing on a Foucaldian analysis, Andersson (2012) proposes a view of ADHD linked to the 
formation of a governable and self-regulating subject, situated in the context of Western 
advanced liberalism, and the responsibilisation of the individual. Self-diagnosis and self-
medicalisation, identified in studies with drug users in response to ADHD symptoms, fits very 
well with these ideas of self-reliance and autonomy (Pedersen, Sandberg and Copes, 2015). 
Further removing cultural interpretations of behaviour, behaviour that was previously viewed 
as boredom or dissatisfaction are thus increasingly translated into a neuropsychiatric 
condition (Andersson, 2012). The diagnosis may, in this way, reflect culturally-biased 
judgements upon deviant individuals (Rafalovich, 2005). As pointed out by Johannisson 
(2013), the space for what is ‘normal’ is continuously shrinking, with conceptions and ideas 
of what is defined as ‘healthy’, ‘ill’, ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ being in constant flux. Indeed, 
the cut off between ‘normal’ and ADHD is becoming increasingly challenging to define 
(Pedersen, 2014). This is an argument recently echoed in the UK context, when a report of 
the use of ADHD medications suggested a growing ‘intolerance of difference’, with children 
who do not conform to norms seen to have something wrong with them (Weale, 2014). 
 
Responses and treatment 
Thinking about responses to diagnoses, recent years have seen an exponential growth of 
medicalised ADHD treatment methods. Key pharmaceuticals include Adderall, Benxodrine, 
Dexedrine and Methylphenidate (Ritalin) (Rafalovich, 2005). In the UK, 2007 to 2012 saw a 
56% increase in methylphenidate being prescribed to children and young people (Hill and 
Turner, 2016). Saul (2016) links these trends to a broader ‘pill-focussed’ culture, where 
stimulant-use is increasing in a range of populations; from students aiming for high grades, to 
employees who are required to work long hours. Looking specifically at the use of 
medicalisation in the Swedish criminal justice system, there are ongoing experimental studies 
involving prescribing prisoners/offending populations with methylphenidate. The Swedish 
Prison and Probation Service suggests that methylphenidate can decrease ADHD-symptoms 
by up to 70% (Kriminalvården, 2013). Another Swedish study (Lichenstein et al, 2012) found 
that female patients receiving ADHD medication saw a 41% reduction in criminality 
(compared to 32% of male patients). However, this reduction was only noted during 
treatment periods, and hence, the long-term effects remain more uncertain. Overall, studies 
have not found ADHD to be a predictor of reoffending (Grieger and Hosser, 2012), so 
treatment being ‘sold’ as a reducer of recidivism is problematic.  
The use of stimulants has also been linked to a range of side effects, including chemical 
dependence in later life (Rafalovich, 2000), although other studies argue that there is little 
evidence that stimulants are addictive when used for ADHD specifically (Young et al, 2011). 
That said, research indicate that self-medicalisation uses are more closely associated with 
addiction problems than social uses (Pedersen, Sandberg and Copes, 2015), with some 
authors arguing that stimulant treatments are a contraindicatory approach for individuals 
with existing substance abuse issues (Schubert et al, 2009). Despite the fact that, according 
to the official guidelines, medicalisation should always be implemented as part of a broader 
treatment programme (Young et al, 2011), concerns have been raised by professionals 
working in the field that medicalisation typically takes a primary position over psychological 
treatments, commonly due to budget constraints in local authorities (Hill and Turner, 2016).  
 
Beneficiaries of diagnosis?  
Slee (1997) invites us to critically consider the question of whose interests are served by the 
discovery and ongoing escalation of ADHD diagnoses. There are, in fact, Slee (1997) goes on 
to suggest, a range of beneficiaries including students who benefit from the opportunity to 
receive special educational interventions, parents benefitting from a ‘chemically calm’ child, 
as well as special educational workers benefitting from a larger client base. In a time of ever-
growing cuts and challenging funding situations, it is not hard to see the potential benefit of 
high levels of diagnoses. A diagnosis furthermore plays an important attention focussing 
function. Specifically, it can remove responsibility from the setting, both familiar and societal, 
and move the attention to the individual, or rather, to the biological set-up of the individual 
(Hallerstedt, 2013; Hill and Turner, 2016). Reducing space for cultural interpretations of 
behaviour indeed fits well with current processes of responsibilisation and risk-need 
frameworks in criminal justice (Young et al, 2011). 
Not only can a diagnosis provide potential benefits to surrounding populations, such as 
parents, teachers and others, but it can also offer personal comfort to the diagnosed. 
Evidence show that a diagnosis can provide answers, reduce anxiety and stigma (Hill and 
Turner, 2016), as well as provide a sense of group belonging; something that is especially 
valuable if the person has experienced forms of exclusion or difference over their lifetime 
(Kärfve, 2013). The diagnosis can thus provide a useful explanatory framework and can help 
an individual make sense of circumstances and behaviours. To this end, Johannisson (2013:40) 
argues that medical categorisations influence how individuals experience the self, that is, 
once diagnosed the individual becomes the diagnosis and accordingly, explanatory 
understandings of behaviour inevitably follow from this. These labels can, in turn, trap 
individuals, by limiting how they perceive themselves currently, in the past, as well as in the 
future (Berger, 2015); embodying a classic example of labelling theory (Becker, 1963). 
These new explanatory understandings of behaviour may be especially useful to individuals 
who are involved in the criminal justice system. For example, in a study by Schubert et al 
(2009), it was found that for a Norwegian (all-male) sample receiving treatment for 
amphetamine dependency, an ADHD diagnosis allowed them to construct a legitimated drug-
using narrative as an ADHD patient; effectively downplaying their status as an illicit drug user. 
Deviant behaviour is thus reframed as illness, which is seen to act as a mitigating factor for 
criminality. As the diagnosis ties into a range of culturally acknowledged medical behaviours, 
with stimulant use being the most common treatment, individuals become exempted from 
responsibility and guilt (Berger, 2015). Pedersen, Sandberg and Copes (2015) have found that 
amphetamine users’ ADHD narratives commonly construct their stimulant use as ‘medical’, 
therefore shifting the self from a morally problematic social category (i.e. drug user), to a 
morally neutral status (i.e. ‘patient’). Similar functions have been detected in cannabis users’ 
narratives; Pedersen (2014) for example found that ADHD diagnoses were commonly 
employed to transform cannabis use into a more morally neutral ‘illness’ narrative, with 
interviewees marking a strong distance between intoxication for pleasure and use as a 
response to their condition. Berger (2015) argues that legitimising deviancy through an ADHD 
narrative in this way functions as an effective ‘technique of neutralization’ (Sykes and Matza, 
1957). Social responsibility is accordingly removed from the individual, with a biological label 
being attached to behaviour, and at the same time, legal access to amphetamine-based 
medicines are opened up.  
Interlinked to the prescriptive use of stimulants, additional beneficiaries must be noted in the 
ADHD equation. The pharmaceutical market, ever so willing to provide growing quantities of 
for example Ritalin, is undeniably a big winner in the diagnosis trend (Kärfve, 2013). Pedersen, 
Sandberg and Copes (2015) note how the increased legal control of amphetamines since the 
1970s have been paralleled by a dramatic increase of misuse of pharmaceutical stimulants. A 
key tool for diagnosis is the APAi manual, with wide-ranging diagnosis scripts available. There 
are some critical concerns raised regarding the nature of the relationship between 
pharmaceutical companies, the construction of the DSMii and corporate links with APA 
(Rafalovich, 2005). For example, there is some evidence of strong lobbying forces, funded by 
Pharmaceutical giants, to get new diagnoses into the DSM (Brante, 2013). In 2013 the 
American National Institute for Mental Health came out arguing for a move away from 
classifying disorders via DSM criteria, and called for new, objective, ways to define mental 
health disorders (Hill and Turner, 2016).  
 
The Stories Across Borders studyiii 
ADHD was an ‘unexpected visitor’ in the data that was collected for my doctoral thesis ‘Stories 
Across Border: How female ex-offenders make sense of their journey through crime and 
criminal justice in Sweden and England’. This was a cross-national qualitative research project, 
exploring different lived experiences of moving through criminal justice systems by women, 
who at the time of the interview identified as desisters, across Sweden and England. 
Grounded in a feminist methodology (Kelly et al, 1994; Bloom, 1998; Maynard and Purvis, 
1994), the study conducted life-story narrative interviews with 24 women; 12 in Sweden and 
12 in England. The narratives produced in the study were primarily used as a method of 
inquiry (Orbuch, 1997), i.e., used to access other, thematically organised, aspects of the social 
world. Informed by symbolic interactionism, the thematic analysis exclusively focussed on 
participants' first-hand interpretations and perceptions of their own lived reality, and no 
external validation of life-events or experiences were sought for the analytical reading of the 
data. In line with a feminist research agenda, subjectivity stood at the core of the qualitative 
approach, which is proposed to make more justice to women’s lives, as well as allowing them 
to define their own problems and perspectives (Barberet, 2014). Feministic methods 
furthermore replace neutrality and indifference by conscious partiality (Bryman, 2008) and 
intentionally seek for emancipatory goals of feminism to be realised, for all those who are 
oppressed by existing social and power relations (Hudson, 2000). 
The participants were, in the main, recruited via organisations working with female ex-
offenders, either in a statutory setting or within the charitable sector. The ethical aspects of 
the study were a key part of its design, and the research was scrutinised and approved by the 
University of Surrey’s Ethics Committee. Placing people and their life-stories at the very heart 
of the project's data gathering process, the interviews took a narrative life-story format. The 
narrative interview is a type of qualitative, in-depth interview which moves beyond the 
question-and-response structure (Bauer, 1996), and this, combined with a life-story format, 
allowed for subjective conceptions of lived experiences to be linked with wider social and 
historical contexts (Messerschmidt, 1997; Adriansen, 2012). This type of interview is deemed 
especially appropriate in research that deals with sensitive forms of personal experience. 
However, it is important to be mindful of the fact that narratives produced in interviews 
represent purposeful account-making, which are guided by expectations and shaped by the 
particular research situation (Jovechelovitch and Bauer, 2000). Moreover, this interview 
format also has limitations in terms of what it can, and cannot, reveal.  As noted by Bryman 
(2008), it is questionable how far narratives can reflect any underlying ‘truth’ about events, 
or indeed to what extent they can access divergent realities experienced by different groups 
of individuals, including aspects of structural forces that may have a bearing on the lived 
experience. 
Moreover, it is important to note that the narrative data excerpts presented in this paper 
were not the product of a targeted interview focus. That is, ADHD did not form a part of the 
interview schedule for the original study, and it was a discourse that was completely absent 
in the English data. This is noteworthy, and feed into a key point raised by previous scholars 
in the field; how individuals describe and frame their behaviour will depend on what 
narratives and discourses that are available to them (Berger, 2015). In the English data, 
narratives relating to conditions such as Border Personality Disorder, and Emotionally 
Unstable Personality Disorder were drawn on, which may reflect a more prominent role of 
these discourses in the English criminal justice setting. It is noteworthy that these conditions 
did not have an equivalent in the Swedish data. Berger (2015) argues that the level to which 
a specific medical narrative is drawn on as an explanatory factor can be used to gage the level 
of cultural legitimacy that it is given in any one society. 
As the fieldwork in Sweden progressed, the number of women who brought up ADHD 
reflections in the interviews grew. At the start of the project, these stories were brought up 
unsolicited by the interviewer, and were often mentioned as a side-line within other broader 
narrative constructions. However, as an increasing number of participants were mentioning 
ADHD in their storytelling, I began to ask question about it towards the later stages of the 
data collection process. For these reasons, the data were not suitable for comparison across 
the two countries, and the area of ADHD was therefore not a focus in the final thesis, nor in 
the book REMOVED FOR REVIEW that followed, which focusses more exclusively on the 
female journey towards desistance in Sweden and England.  
Between a half and two thirds of the Swedish sample identified with an ADHD diagnosisiv. The 
women within this group ranged in age from 24-37 and were interviewed across three 
different cities in Sweden. A range of offending types were presented, with some having an 
extensive criminal record, while others having just a handful of convictions. Most had spent 
time in prison, though not all, and all the women in this group had a history of substance 
misuse, predominantly heavy amphetamine use. The data is here presented in its ‘raw’ form, 
and are intended to show first-hand illustrations of female experiences of ADHD diagnoses in 
the Swedish criminal justice system; thus acting as springboards for critical reflections on 
ADHD diagnoses in this particular setting. All of the data on ADHD detected in the study were 
explored for this purpose, and the illustrative examples presented below represent the main 
subjective perspectives detected therein. Due to the limitations of the data discussed above, 
the narrative examples and findings are solely exploratory and not suitable for empirical 
generalisations. The data has been translated by myself, using a 'conceptual equivalence' 
approach; meaning that I have prioritised 'free' translation, rather than 'lexical comparability' 
(Birbili, 2000).  
 
ADHD narratives by female ex-offenders 
This section will offer illustrations of ADHD narratives that were present in the data, and 
critically reflect on what different functions and purposes the diagnostic discussions may 
have. The women’s identification with the diagnosis was varied, and are suggestive of 
different diagnostic functions and frameworks. Two major themes in the data are that the 
diagnosis provides a retrospective new understanding of difficulties experienced in their 
youth, particularly in educational settings, as well as offering a framework by which they can 
understand their drug use. The diagnosis thus allows individuals to effectively reinterpret 
parts of their life-stories, especially those that may be stigmatising or seen as deviant 
(Pedersen, 2014). The nature of the women’s drug use, and their abilities on the drug-using 
scene, was by some reinterpreted through the ADHD diagnosis. 'Linda', a long-term 
amphetamine user who has an extensive criminal record, here for example explains how she 
felt that everything fell ‘into place’ when she received her diagnosis and started to medicate; 
giving her a new perspective on how she ‘functioned’ during her drug abusing years: 
Linda: Like I get medication today, and I mean that’s amphetamines, I get that 
constantly now. And there it was just like 'ba ba boom', everything just falls into place. 
[...] Cos’ when I used [amphetamines], and of course it's all about quantity, but when 
I’ve used I’ve always started on a really high dose to then trap down and settle for just 
a little. [...] And I’ve functioned, you know, people are just like 'aa I must have dope 
must have dope', like 'fuck, grab a sandwich and go to bed', you know what I mean? 
[...] I mean I’ve never taken apart a DVD or, you know, people screw apart their entire 
homes, people tape their door shut, they…yeah, everything you know. […] 
 
[I: So you think that has to do with your ADHD?] 
 
Linda: Yeah, well I mean I don’t know … but the fact that I’ve not had any psychoses, 
that I’ve, like I’ve also many times, even though I might have ended up in lots of tricky 
situations, but especially now later when I've got more mature in my addiction, I’ve 
always been able to read [a situation]. If I’m by myself and a guy comes in who I know 
sells a lot of drugs and he comes in and offers me, like 'No Way', no – Am I gonna do 
drugs then I’m gonna buy my drugs. And they can’t take it, 'iiii', cos’ then I know, then 
there’s a catch on me, because that I’d never give. [...] I’ve not done like really stupid 
things like, I’ve never, you know, sure you end up in situations that are difficult to 
handle and all that, but still I've always been kind of 'with it'.  
 
In this narrative ’Linda’ seems to suggest that her ADHD has allowed her to use drugs 
(specifically amphetamines) in a more controlled manner. She accordingly makes sense of her 
experiences on the criminal/drug-using scene through this very specific lens, and makes her 
desistance path connected to continued medicalisation. Similarly to other studies (Berger, 
2015), the effects of prescription drugs here seem to validate the neurological basis of a more 
socially accepted medical narrative. Moreover, ‘Linda’ also identifies how receiving the 
diagnosis for her produced a sense of ‘everything falling into place’. The diagnosis thus offers 
a meaningful reference for understanding life experiences through a new perspective 
(Pedersen, 2014). As ‘Linda’s drug use becomes construed in medical terms, she is effectively 
distancing herself from drug use as pleasure and/or deviance. From a critical perspective, it is 
interesting to reflect on what other explanatory frameworks that are being relegated through 
the dominance of this specific lens. In contrast to common female amphetamine-using 
narratives that focus on traditional female activities, such as effectively managing a busy 
family life (Pedersen, Sandberg and Copes, 2015), ‘Linda’s narrative indicates that her ADHD 
may have allowed her a higher performing criminal life.  
Considering what other explanatory frameworks that have been relegated through this; could 
for example Linda’s ability - as a self-identified drug addict - not to accept free drugs from a 
man, who she then might be expected to offer something in return to, be interpreted via a 
lens of individual agency? Could it be interpreted via a sense of choice, of not using sex as a 
trading tool for drugs? Does this narrative suggest something about what opportunities that 
are subjectively experienced as available on the criminal scene for women in Sweden? Rather 
than looking at this through a lens of female agency and self-reliance, ‘Linda’ instead draws 
on her diagnosis to explain a level of control within her drug use, which she today links to her 
methylphenidate prescription use. This is in line with studies that suggest that the use of 
stimulants can mean that the ‘locus of control’ for behaviour become dependent on the use 
of medications (Rafalovich, 2005). In turn, this interpretation of control may have important 
consequences for the individual’s desistance narrative. Drawing on cognitive 
transformational desistance perspectives, we know that the internalisation of control, and a 
subjective sense of ability to overcome obstacles, can be an important factor for a successful 
desistance identity (Maruna, 2001). While the medicalisation of everyday life can fill the 
individual with optimism about the future (Berger, 2015), to locate this control specifically 
within a medicalised path could have a negative effect on the subjective sense of overcoming 
obstacles without continuing medicalisation. Potentially, this narrative construction could be 
an explanatory factor as to why the identified reduction in criminality have not been found to 
be applicable long-term, that is, after medication has been terminated (Lichenstein et al, 
2012). 
 
A different example of a function of an ADHD diagnosis is found in ‘Mia’. ‘Mia’ has one of the 
more extensive histories of childhood abuse found in the Swedish data, including 
experiencing sexual abuse by her father from what she thinks was the age of 3. As a child she 
was diagnosed with several conditions, and she also experienced extensive periods in various 
care/institutional settings. In this quote ‘Mia’ responds to a question about what she 
remembers from being institutionalised at a young age:  
Mia: Like I‘ve just repressed so much, you know, like I've been through trauma therapy 
just to process all that’s happened, eh, and I’ve just chosen to switch off. Um, I mean, I 
guess what started it all was when I moved when I was 12, I lived three days a week at 
home and then the rest I lived in relief families, because, you know, I had severe ADHD 
and I was impulse-driven and with, like I just had so, like aggression was always the 
first feeling. Eh, and people just thought, I just got a bunch of diagnoses, ADHD, 
Asperger's, you know, instead of checking what was going on behind it all. [...] In all of 
these assessments my truth was constantly questioned, cos’ like it was a good family, 
we had a good income, both my parents worked, my dad had his own company, my 
mum had her own shop…  
 
‘Mia’s narrative brings up a number of noteworthy factors, including the issue of ‘silencing’ 
of abuse narratives, which I have written about in other places (see REMOVED FOR REVIEW). 
In terms of the ADHD aspect specifically, it becomes clear in ‘Mia’s’ story that she subjectively 
views her diagnoses to have detracted attention from the abusive environment that she was 
living within. On the surface, her environment seemed ‘good’, it was a ‘good family’, as ‘Mia’ 
says. She also suggests that these factors, the ‘good family’, meant her truth was constantly 
questioned, and she received a range of diagnoses ‘instead of checking what was going on 
behind it all’. ‘Mia’s narrative here seems to give support to some of the critical arguments 
highlighted above, namely, how the medical model can dominate on the cost of social and 
psychological dimensions. From a critical perspective, the key question here is whether a less 
medical understanding of ‘Mia’s’ aggression problems, rather than judging these through a 
neuropsychiatric frame, might have helped to identify the abuse ‘Mia’ was suffering in her 
home at an earlier time, and possibly also allowed her avenues to start dealing with these in 
a less medicated way. This data supports Kärfve’s (2013) suggestions of how a diagnosis can 
carry important consequences in terms of removing responsibility and blame from social 
environments. In fact, some argue that the symptoms that are connected to ADHD could be 
considered a normal response to extreme adversity, and many symptoms are indeed 
consistent with those presented by children who have experienced trauma or abuse (Hill and 
Turner, 2016). What is more, there is also a hint of a lived sense of lack of adequate support 
in ‘Mia’s narrative. Berger (2015) notes how professionals and frontline workers’ lack of 
support can be drawn on to reduce personal responsibility for a stigmatised or negative past.  
For our third example, we turn our attention to 'Malin'. ‘Malin’ has not been diagnosed with 
ADHD herself and does not identify with the symptoms. However, having spent a couple of 
years in prison, she had a range of viewpoints on the role of ADHD diagnoses for women in 
the Swedish criminal justice system. Her narrative gives support to how embedded discourses 
of ADHD within the Prison and Probation Service (Berger, 2015) may open up individual 
opportunities for drawing on this medically-orientated narrative in this particular setting. 
‘Malin’ here responds to the question whether she had the experience of going through an 
ADHD assessment in criminal justice setting: 
Malin: Do you know what I’ve actually battled a lot with people about this, because 
it feels like, within the Kriminalvårdenv, and sure it could be the case that many have 
ADHD, I don’t say that isn’t the case, but it’s just how Swedish society has become, I 
mean, like as soon as someone makes the slightest, you know, deviant, then it's like 
'yup diagnosis'. As if that would explain everything! And in prison, both at X and X, 
there were so many diagnostic groups, you know. Like, I mean, I would estimate that 
about 80% were diagnosed with ADHD. […] And as I said, you know, I've never felt 
that kind of symptoms really […], so I’ve not really been interested in it, you know, 
but I mean would anyone have even the slightest interest to explore that possibility 
then there’s like these big [indicate ‘large’ with hands] opportunities to do so 
[laughs]. [...] But then also, if I’m gonna be completely honest, I have to say that 
there were quite a lot of those who wanted the diagnosis, just in order to medicate. 
That’s something that you might not speak very loudly of, but that was really what 
was going on.  
Although ‘Malin’ herself does not have a diagnosis, and does not feel the symptoms apply to 
her either, subjectively she expresses confidence that she could have received a diagnosis if 
she wanted to. This is in line with other Nordic studies that have shown that prisoners often 
suggest a huge prevalence of ADHD inside, with ‘almost everybody’ having it (Pedersen, 2014: 
7). Not only is the self-narrative validated by wider cultural scripts (Berger, 2015), but the 
particular context of the Swedish criminal justice system also appears to offer a setting that 
invites individuals to construct a medically-orientated self-narrative, through encouraging 
diagnostic assessment opportunities. Assessment procedures play an important role here, 
and the way these are used in the criminal justice system have received considerable critique. 
For example, Stokkeland et al (2014) found that assessment tools such as self-report scales 
and MINI plus diagnostic interviews did not produce valid ADHD results for prison 
populations. These types of assessment are thus likely to produce over-diagnosis, suggesting 
over-estimations of the commonality of ADHD in prison populations. Additionally, the specific 
assessment setting must also be considered. The nature of incarceration may, indeed, 
produce symptoms associated with ADHD (Grieger and Hosser, 2012) and should be taken 
into account when assessing. Moreover, Young et al (2011) argue that criminal justice 
professionals often lack the adequate knowledge, skills and training for dealing with ADHD, 
as professionals are either experts in criminal justice or experts in ADHD. For women 
generally, and for women with substance use in particular, Konstenius et al (2012) suggest 
that more careful assessments that can enable a distinction of ADHD from substance use, as 
well as from other psychiatric disorders, is required in order to obtain the correct diagnosis. 
More comprehensive and detailed assessment are, however, unlikely to fit with shrinking 
criminal justice budgets. Especially in this socio-economic context, it is essential that we do 
not allow pharmaceutical drugs to become ‘magic bullets’ in the criminal justice system to 
correct and manage individual behaviour (Moore and Hannah-Moffat, 2005). 
An interlinking aspect of the data on ADHD is found in the area of who is the initiator of the 
diagnostic assessment. Two of the women have very specific memories of this situation, both 
relating to their solicitor suggesting the possibility of an ADHD diagnosis. For example, ‘Linda’ 
here reflects on how she first was introduced to the idea of a diagnosis: 
Linda: Well, my lawyer said it, I've had him for several years, and they said it at the 
jail in X as well, when I was locked up in there for 3 months and they came in and I 
was reading like three books at the same time. So yeah, everything like that, that was 
it. 
For ‘Linda’, this was a suggestion she very much welcomed, and she went on to seek out an 
assessment and was then diagnosed and prescribed methylphenidate, which for her came as 
a positive. In contrast, ‘Carolina’ had similar suggestions from her solicitor, but responded in 
a different way: 
Carolina: No, I’ve never been assessed for it, eh...I don’t think I have it, but I’m not 
sure. […] I was kind of considering it for a while, cos’ I had a solicitor once who told me 
that I should do it [assessment]. So after that I considered it for a while…but no, I don’t 
think so. [...] He said that he thought that I should do an ADHD assessment and that, 
like 'most girls who end up here where you are have ADHD', and what else did he 
say...ah yeah that my body language suggested it. But then I’ve seen him again since 
and I asked him, cos’ it was something that stayed on my mind, and then he said 'oh 
really did I say that? I can’t remember, it probably had something to do with the way 
you sat on the chair', or something along those lines. So I didn’t take it too serious. 
 
This narrative suggests that the original ‘plantation’ of a diagnosis may come from a variety 
of sources within the criminal justice system, and are not exclusive to the prison or sentence 
context. It is indicative of how labels can and are encouraged by professionals, potentially 
creating a self-fulfilling prophecy (Hill and Turner, 2016). The fact that the way a woman 'sits 
on a chair', especially in the setting of custody following a police arrest, would encourage a 
solicitor to suggest an ADHD assessment is questionable. Again, the context seems to be 
missing; in this case the stressful situation of being arrested, spending time in custody, and, 
most likely, starting to withdraw from drugs, which all are likely factors influencing how the 
person in question would ‘sit on the chair’. What is clear in these examples is that it is up to 
the individual in question whether they interpret the diagnostic possibility as a positive, or if 
they choose to, as ‘Carolina’ does, to not ‘take it too seriously’. Furthermore, this narrative 
gives support to previous studies that have found that although many individuals in the 
criminal justice system welcome a diagnosis, others want to be ‘normal’ and therefore resist 
diagnostic opportunities (Pedersen, 2014). Kärfve (2013) suggests that the level of welcoming 
of a diagnosis is linked to a range of individual and contextual factors, including whether the 
person has experienced exclusion. Bearing in mind that research demonstrate a link between 
a lower socioeconomic standing and a positive ADHD diagnosis (Savolainen et al, 2010), we 
can only hypothesise whether the fact that ‘Carolina’ was one of the few middle-class 
participants mattered for her willingness to explore the diagnostic opportunity. The class 
aspects would certainly be an interesting factor to consider for future research in this area.  
It is clear, then, that there can be resistance to diagnosis, and for some, this resistance was 
specifically linked to access to medicines and attempts to move away from a drug-using 
narrative. ‘Angel’ provides an example of this; here talking about how she is currently trying 
to be creative to avoid boredom: 
Angel: It’s just like really quiet everything now, if I put it like that, you just have to find, try to 
be creative and find other stuff to satisfy your ADHD, I mean, if you have to sit still....Yeah it’s 
this thing that you always think something should happen. Like, that doesn’t just disappear in 
a day. 
 
[I: When were you diagnosed with ADHD?] 
 
Angel: Well I'm not, no, I don’t give a shit if I have it or not, but it's just something I imagine I 
could have, but it’s not something I really care, if I have it or if I don’t, ‘cos I don’t want to have 
any medication for it, but yeah the thought has been there plenty of times. 
 
This is an interesting case, as even though ‘Angel’ ‘imagines’ that ADHD is something that she 
may have, she has chosen not to seek out an official diagnosis for it. Self-diagnosis of ADHD 
is indeed common among drug-users and is typically based on what is known about the 
condition from networks, the media and lay pharmacological knowledge (Pedersen, 2014). In 
‘Angel’s case, her narrative suggests that for her, to not receive a diagnosis acts as a form of 
self-protection, specifically blocking access to stimulant prescriptions, that supports her 
desistance path. This also demonstrates the previously identified blurred border between 
illegal drug use and the use of prescription stimulants (Berger, 2015), as well as how the 
potential for misuse and dependency of medications such as Ritalin are typically known by 
potential users (Pedersen, 2014). The pharmaceutical forces towards medical treatments 
discussed above, together with a criminal justice setting that encourage diagnostic access, 
must here be critically reflected on via a perspective of individual resistance to dominant 
narratives. In support of previous studies with incarcerated women and the use of 
prescription drugs (Smirnova and Owens, 2017), not only does the woman need to trust the 
medical professionals, but she must also be able to trust herself to use them in appropriate 
manner. 
 
Conclusory reflections and future directions 
The ‘unexpected’ ADHD visitor in my study has, in many ways, raised more questions than 
answers. What role do these diagnostic trends have for subjective interpretations of 
behaviour by female ex-offenders? Are diagnoses offering helpful answers or unhelpful 
labels? Are there particular gendered aspects within these developments? And how do they 
fit with contemporary criminal justice policy and practice? This paper has demonstrated that 
women in criminal justice both conform to as well as resist ADHD labels and medicalised 
treatment models. Emphasising the exploratory nature of this study, and the limitation of the 
data, the aim of this paper has not been to try to establish whether the diagnosis is a medical 
fact, but rather, to give female voices on diagnosis a space in a typically male-dominated 
criminal justice (and ADHD) landscape. So how are narratives of diagnosis conveyed first-
hand, and what subjective function do they play? It is clear from the data that ADHD can 
become a narrative resource that individuals can draw on, with some functional advantages. 
The key question is, of course, to what consequence? The data has suggested a possibility 
that individuals are, through labels, narrowing subjective conceptualisations of their own 
behaviour, and thereby relegating other, potentially more empowering, interpretations of 
behaviour. Moreover, the overreliance on medicalised treatments must be questioned in a 
broader penal practice perspective: Are medications the most suitable and effective 
treatment for a particular individual, or are they the most cost-effective and less time-
consuming way to deal with behaviour that may be symptomatic of other underlying issues? 
It seems unlikely to be a coincidence that the dominance of the medical treatment model has 
grown in parallel with risk-based criminal justice models and individual responsibilisation 
frameworks. Situating the global trend of the forceful return of biological explanations 
(Brante, 2013, Kärfve, 2013) in current socio-economic processes, biological perspectives on 
behaviours, and the associated medicated treatment interventions, also fits well with 
contemporary calls for ‘quick fixes’ (Hill and Turner, 2016: 20). With welfare agencies being 
significantly underfunded, it is clearly cheaper to prescribe medications rather than explore 
other more resource-heavy interventions.  
This paper has suggested that the experience of diagnosis can serve a number of functions. 
Specifically, examples have been provided to show how new explanatory frameworks for 
previous behaviours can be applied through the diagnostic lens; that diagnoses can be 
subjectively experienced as deflecting attention from problematic social and environmental 
contexts; and that some criminal justice institutions offer a particularly ‘friendly’ setting for 
diagnostic access and encouragement. For some women in this study, the ADHD diagnosis 
narratively linked to a new understanding of behaviour, that encouraged a more desistance-
orientated – albeit medically-dependent - narrative. In contrast, however, for others a 
resistance to formal diagnosis acted as a desistance factor, as a diagnosis was deemed to pose 
a risk to a drug-free self-narrative. 
Overall, it is argued that there are important contextual questions that require attention in 
this debate, including a critical exploration of the beneficiaries of these diagnostic trends and 
consequences of lived experiences of women in the criminal justice system. Additionally, 
critical queries about the production of knowledge must also be raised. That is, where and 
how is ‘expert’ knowledge about ADHD produced, and in what ways is it applied? Brante 
(2013) highlights how the pharmaceutical giant Novartis has funded and supported research 
proving the use of medicalisation treatments of ADHD. Especially in an increasingly market-
driven research climate, the academic community arguably has a key responsibility in 
scrutinising the links between research funding, dissemination of findings, and the serving of 
particular interests. Interdisciplinary research practice is accordingly called for, ensuring that 
different voices are heard, and that no one field, such as the biomedical field, gain a monopoly 
position of research in this area. 
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